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Abstract
Motivated by the hypothesis that financial crashes are macroscopic
examples of critical phenomena associated with a discrete scaling sym-
metry, we reconsider the evidence of log-periodic precursors to financial
crashes and test the prediction that log-periodic oscillations in a financial
index are embedded in the mean function of this index. In particular, we
examine the first differences of the logarithm of the S&P 500 prior to the
October 87 crash and find the log-periodic component of this time series
is not statistically significant if we exclude the last year of data before
the crash. We also examine the claim that two separate mechanisms are
needed to explain the frequency distribution of draw downs in the S&P
500 and find the evidence supporting this claim to be unconvincing.
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Figure 1: The S&P 500 from 1982 to 1988 and a fit according to Eq. (1) with
A = 380.4, B = −10.8, C = −.0743, tc = 10/20/87, α = .422, ω = 5.965, and
φ = .124.
1 Introduction
Several authors in the physics community (including [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6],
[7], and [8]) have written about the appearance of log-periodic oscillations in
stock market indices during the months and years leading up to financial crashes.
By a log-periodic oscillation, we mean that a variable exhibits a functional form
such as
y(x) = A+Bxα [1 + C cos(ω lnx+ φ)] . (1)
The cosine term in this expression produces oscillations with a period that grows
or shrinks exponentially. As an example, if we let x = tc − t, where tc is the
time of the well-known crash of October 19, 1987, then we can see this pattern
in the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) during the five years prior to the
crash as shown in Fig. 1.
Such log-periodic oscillations are of interest to physicists because log-
periodicity is the signature of a spatial environment with a discrete scaling
symmetry. The observation of log-periodic precursors has been interpreted
as evidence that the subsequent financial crash can be viewed as a critical
point analogous to a phase transition in a more traditional physics environ-
ment. Heuristically, this picture of a transition to an ordered state is certainly
consistent with what happens during a stock market crash, when virtually all
investors will be in agreement that the price is dropping and that they should
sell, in contrast to the normal disordered state where the price remains fairly
stable because there is a buyer for every seller. The theoretical issue is how far
this analogy can properly be taken.
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One can envision a discrete scaling symmetry arising in financial mar-
kets if one models investors as forming networks of friends and contacts. If
every agent has n contacts, it is indeed possible to construct a network which
exhibits a scaling symmetry. Johansen et al. [9] propose a model of imitative
investors, living in such a network, which is essentially an Ising spin model.
A spin-up constituent represents a buyer, a spin-down constituent represents
a seller, and neighboring spins interact in a manner that encourages them to
align in the same direction. Johansen et al. respond to the criticism that a
rational agent could exploit log-periodic fluctuations to his financial advantage,
and thereby acquire all the wealth in the economy, by requiring that stock prices
obey a martingale condition that would rule out arbitrage opportunities. How
the collective behavior of the imitative investors translates into a price that sat-
isfies this martingale condition is left unmodeled. Regardless of the underlying
details, this martingale condition is a very strong restriction on the behavior of
prices, and testing this condition is the primary focus of the present paper.
A major deficiency of the vast body of previous work on log-periodic
precursors is that most of the analysis has been qualitative rather than statistical
in nature. The emphasis has been placed on establishing the existence of log-
periodic fluctuations, usually through curve-fitting or more recently through the
use of Lomb periodograms ([10]). We should note that we take it as a given in
this paper that such methods are valid. We do not dispute the existence of log-
periodic fluctuations like those pictured in Fig. 1. What remains controversial
is why these fluctuations exist. Are they indeed part of a collective process
leading up to a phase transition? Or can they be more simply explained as an
accidental feature of the stochastic processes that drive financial indices? Only
statistical methods have the power to distinguish these possibilities.
A small amount of work has already been done in this vein. Feigenbaum
and Freund [2] modeled the stock market as a random walk and found that the
average time between a log-periodic spell and the next financial crash was signif-
icantly longer in real-world data than in Monte Carlo simulations. Johansen et
al. ([9], [10]) report similar results from an experiment where they modeled the
stock market as a GARCH process. While these are positive results with respect
to the hypothesis of crashes as critical points, they are both strongly tied to a
specific model of the underlying stochastic process, what statisticians term the
data generating process (DGP). One cannot extrapolate from these two results
to conclude that no DGP can account for log-periodicity. The null hypothesis
that log-periodic spells are the casual products of random fluctuations.has not
been rejected.
While most studies of log-periodicity have focused on prices, the present
paper applies statistical hypothesis testing to the question of whether the first
differences of a price process exhibiting log-periodic fluctuations are also log-
periodic. This question is of interest because any model in which log-periodic
price fluctuations reflect corresponding fluctuations in the mean of the price
process will require that the mean of the first differences should also behave
log-periodically. In particular, the model of Johansen et al. [9] requires this.
Moreover, it is well-known among econometricians that regression estimators
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are inconsistent when applied to a serially-correlated time series like a stock
price. First differencing the stock price can substantially eliminate this serial
correlation and may eliminate effects produced by it. Consequently, the absence
of log-periodic fluctuations from the first differences of a price process suggests
(although certainly does not prove) that log-periodicity in the integrated price
process may be due to serial correlation and random effects.
Examining the first differences for the logarithm of the S&P 500 from
1980 to 1987, we find that the log-periodic component of the Sornette-Johansen
specification is statistically significant if we include this entire period in the fit.
However, if we exclude the last year, the log-periodic component is no longer
statistically significant. Furthermore, the best fit in this truncated data set
predicts a crash in June of 1986, shortly after the data set ends but well before
the actual crash. Presumably the log-periodic fit is coupling to some structure
in the data just prior to the crash which does not characterize the whole time
series. Thus we conclude that log-periodicity is either negligible or not present
in these first differences, a negative result for the model of Johansen et al. [9].
A second claim that we consider was put forward by Johansen and Sor-
nette [11] and pertains to the distribution of drawdowns, where a drawdown
is the accumulated drop in an index from a local maximum to the next local
minimum. Assuming that the fat-tailed distribution of daily returns falls off
exponentially in the limit of large negative returns, they derive that the distri-
bution of drawdowns should also be exponential. Empirically, they find that
the frequency distribution of drawdowns over the past century does indeed look
exponential except for three outliers, the 29 and 87 crashes and a crash during
World War I. They infer from this that a different mechanism must be respon-
sible for these outliers and suggest that this mechanism is also responsible for
producing log-periodic oscillations. In principle, however, one can examine any
set of data with one dependent variable and say that the graph looks expo-
nential except for some outliers. In order to make this a testable claim, one
has to consider whether there are statistically significant deviations from the
exponential curve. In fact, statistically significant deviations do occur, and we
conclude that this evidence of a special crash mechanism is unconvincing.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic ele-
ments of the Sornette-Johansen framework and note some theoretical criticisms.
Since the initial papers on this subject appeared, Sornette and Johansen [12]
have developed a more sophisticated specification for observed log-periodic os-
cillations, treating the logarithm of the price index as the dependent variable
rather than the price itself. We will see in Section 3 that the logarithmic spec-
ification does fit the S&P 500 prior to the 87 crash. It also fits to the S&P 500
prior to downturns in 1974, 1997, 1998, and an otherwise unremarkable down-
turn of less than 1% in 1985. This last finding raises the spectre that perhaps
log-periodic behavior is not especially noteworthy and is not inherently related
to crashes. In Section 4, we examine the first differences of the logarithm of the
S&P 500 during the period of 1980 to 1987 and test the statistical significance of
the log-periodic component of the Sornette-Johansen specification. In Section
5, we consider the distribution of drawdowns over the period from 1962 to 1998
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and examine whether the 87 crash deserves classification as an outlier. Finally,
in Section 6, we offer some concluding remarks.
2 The Sornette-Johansen Paradigm
Johansen et al. [9] model the behavior of a speculative stock which pays no
dividends. They allow for the possibility that at least one rational, risk neutral
agent with rational expectations, who does not discount the future, exists in
their economy. Given this assumption, the stock price p(t) must follow a
martingale. For all t′ > t,
Et [p(t
′)] = p(t), (2)
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on all information avail-
able at t. Strictly speaking, the Et operator in Eq. (2) would refer to an
expectation based on the beliefs of the hypothesized agent. When we say the
agent has rational expectations, we mean the agent’s beliefs in fact correspond
to reality, so Et is also the objective expectation operator.
In a market equilibrium where agents behave optimally according to
their preferences, Eq. (2) is an endogenous no-arbitrage condition that must
hold for markets to clear. If Et[p(t
′)] > p(t), a risk-neutral agent will find it
profitable to hold an infinite amount of the stock. Consequently, rational agents
will bid up the price at t until Eq. (2) is satisfied. Similarly, if Et[p(t
′)] < p(t),
rational agents will find it profitable to sell short an infinite amount of the stock.
Since the supply of stock is finite, neither of these two possibilities is consistent
with equilibrium.
Since the stock pays no dividends, its fundamental value (the expected
present value of the stream of future dividends) is zero, so any positive price
constitutes a “bubble”. In a world of perfect certainty, for t′ = t+ 1, Eq. (2)
would translate to the trivial difference equation
pt+1 = pt, (3)
and it would follow by mathematical induction that pt must be a constant.
If we assume that bubbles cannot be sustained forever, then a transversality
condition (essentially the boundary condition at the end of time) will hold:
lim
t→∞
p(t) = 0. (4)
In that case, we will have pt = 0 for all t. Given the transverality condition,
bubbles cannot arise under perfect certainty. With uncertainty, however, Eq. (2)
is no longer a deterministic difference equation and will have an infinite number
of solutions that satisfy the generalized transverality condition
lim
t′→∞
Et[p(t
′)] = 0. (5)
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(See Chapter 5 of [13] for a review of bubble solutions.)
Consequently, Johansen et al. consider a price process which satisfies
Eq. (2) but also introduces the possibility of a crash. Let j denote a random
variable that equals 0 before the crash and 1 afterwards. Denote the continu-
ous distribution function (cdf) of the crash time as Q(t) and the corresponding
probability density function (pdf) as q(t) = Q˙(t). The hazard rate, the proba-
bility per unit time that the crash will happen in the next instant if it has not
already happened, will then be
h(t) =
q(t)
1−Q(t) . (6)
If we assume that the crash involves a downturn of a fixed percentage κ ∈ (0, 1)
of the price, then the price process can be described as
dp
p(t)
= µ(t)dt+ ε(t)− κp(t)dj, (7)
where ε(t) is a mean-zero noise term. The time-dependent drift µ(t) is then
determined by Eq. (2):
Et[dp] = µ(t)p(t)dt− κp(t)h(t)dt = 0. (8)
Thus
µ(t) = κh(t). (9)
Disregarding the noise term (whose contribution may be computed using Ito
calculus), Eq. (7) has the solution
ln
[
p(t)
p(t0)
]
= κ
∫ t
t0
h(t′)dt′ (10)
prior to the crash. The connection of this theory to physics lies in the deter-
mination of the hazard rate function h(t).
In addition to any rational agents in the economy, Johansen et al. posit
the existence of a large number of irrational noise traders, and it is these noise
traders who are responsible for any dynamics leading up to a crash. They
construct a “microscopic” model in which the noise traders are imitative in-
vestors who reside on a local interaction network. Neighbors of an agent on
this network can be viewed as the agent’s friends or contacts, and an agent will
incorporate the views of his neighbors regarding the stock into his own view.
At time t, each agent i is assumed to be in one of two states: a bullish
state sit = +1 or a bearish state sit = −1. If we denote the set of nearest
neighbors as N(i), given the states of all his neighbors at t, i’s state at t + 1
will be determined by
si,t+1 = sgn

K ∑
j∈N(i)
sjt + εi,t+1

 , (11)
6
where K > 0 is a constant and εit is an i.i.d. random variable with E[εit] = 0.
The sign function sgn(x) equals 1 for positive x and −1 for negative x. If i’s
neighbors are preponderantly bullish, i will likely be bullish also, and conversely
if his neighbors are bearish. A crash occurs when virtually all agents are in the
bearish state. Johansen et al. are able to show that the hazard rate function
h(t) will be determined by K, the distribution of the εit, and the structure of
the network. In particular, if the network exhibits a discrete scaling symmetry,
then the hazard rate function will have a log-periodic form like Eq. (1), and
Eq. (10) then implies that the stock price will also behave log-periodically.
One criticism of this model made by Ilinski [14] is that Eq. (2) will
not hold if agents are risk-averse, although the modification he suggests is not
precisely correct. If agents allocate their investments at time t so as to maximize
Et
[∫
∞
t
e−δ(τ−t)u(c(τ))dτ
]
, (12)
where c(t) is consumption at time t, u(·) is the period utility function (which
measures the degree of satisfaction or happiness that an agent derives from a
given level of consumption), and δ is the rate at which agents discount utility
from future consumption, then it can be shown that in equilibrium the price of
a stock must obey
p(t) = e−δ(t
′
−t)Et
[
u′(c(t′))
u′(c(t))
p(t′)
]
(13)
for any t′ > t. Note that, in addition to p(t′), c(t′) will also be a random
variable, so Eq. (13) cannot be simplified to an expression of the form
p(t) = νEt [p(t
′)] , (14)
where ν is a constant. Instead, one typically writes Eq. (13) as
p(t) = Et[ρ(t
′)p(t′)], (15)
where
ρ(t′) = e−δ(t
′
−t)u
′(c(t′))
u′(c(t))
(16)
is often called the pricing kernel. Eq. (15) can still be viewed as describ-
ing a martingale process because the pricing kernel can be interpreted as a
Radon-Nikodym derivative which transforms the probability distribution ([15]).
However, this transformed probability distribution will no longer correspond
to the objective probability distribution, even under the rational expectations
hypothesis.
In [10], Johansen et al. respond to Ilinksi’s criticism, but their rebuttal
applies only to the martingale condition of Eq. (14) and not to the more general
condition of Eq. (15). Their argument is that, since ν in (14) is a finite constant,
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it cannot have any impact on the log-periodicity of E[p(t′)], and this would be
correct if the pricing kernel was a constant. However, the pricing kernel in
general is not a constant and is not even a function of the price. Thus, it is not
obvious that variations in the pricing kernel could not counteract variations in
the price in such a way as to disrupt any log-periodicity.
Moreover, the determination of the pricing kernel is a highly non-trivial
problem if there exists a multiplicity of rational agents who are not identical.
Since Johansen et al. do not model how the collective behavior of the noise
traders is translated into a price, it is not possible for us to even begin such a
computation. But corresponding to every rational agent, there would be an
equation like. (15) which would have to be satisfied, and it is not clear that a
log-periodic price trend could be made compatible with each and every one of
these martingale conditions.
Nevertheless, if we ignore the possibility of risk-averse agents, we do
have a workable model, and we will see in Section 4 whether Eq. (10) with a
log-periodic hazard rate function is consistent with the behavior of the S&P 500
prior to the 1987 crash.
3 The Logarithmic Specification
Although early investigations of log-periodic fluctuations in stock market
indices prior to financial crashes focused on the specification of Eq. (1), Sor-
nette and Johansen [12] introduced an alternative specification in which it is
the logarithm of the price rather than the absolute price which fluctuates log-
periodically. This logarithmic specification is preferable to Eq. (1) because it
is widely assumed that investors are primarily concerned with relative changes
in stock prices rather than absolute changes1. It is also more straightforward to
compare the logarithmic specification to the once popular hypothesis that the
logarithm of a stock price will follow a random walk with drift.
Let t0 be a time prior to the crash at which the stock price has begun
to fluctuate log-periodically. We define
f1(t) =
(tc − t)β√
1 +
(
tc−t
∆t
)2β , (17)
and
f2(t) = f1(t) cos
[
ω ln(tc − t) + ∆ω
2β
ln
(
1 +
(
tc − t
∆t
)2β)
+ φ
]
. (18)
1This focus on relative changes can be understood if investors have constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) preferences (meaning that u(c) in Eq. (12) is either ln c or cγ for γ ≤ 1).
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Then for t0 < t < tc,
Et0 [ln (p(t)) |j(t) = 0] = A+Bf1(t) + Cf2(t), (19)
where Et0 is the objective expectation operator at t0 and j(t) = 0 if no crash has
occurred at or prior to t. This specification has nine free parameters: A, B, C,
ω, β, tc, φ, ∆t (> 0), and ∆ω. Note that in the Sornette-Johansen paradigm,
tc does not necessarily correspond to the time of the crash per se (which we will
denote by t∗) but to a critical time where the probability of a crash becomes
very large. In terms of the microscopic model in [9],
β =
η − 2
η − 1 , (20)
where η is the number of nearest neighbors of each agent. Consequently, if their
model is correct, 0 < β < 1. Sornette and Johansen also suggest making this
restriction so that p(t) does not become unbounded as t → tc. However since
log-periodic behavior typically breaks down as t gets close to tc, it has become
standard practice to disregard data points very close to the observed crash, in
which case Eq. (19) will be bounded in the time span of interest even for β < 0.
The canonical example of a log-periodic precursor can be seen during the
years prior to the October 1987 crash as shown in Fig. 1, so we first consider
the closing value of the S&P 500 for each day between January 1, 1980 and
September 30, 19872. Suppose there are n trading days in this period. Given
a choice of parameters A, B, C, β, ω, tc, φ, ∆t, and ∆ω , we define an n-
dimensional residual vector e by
ei = ln(p(ti))−A+Bf1(ti) + Cf2(ti), (21)
where ti is the time of the ith trading day. The standard practice for estimating
the parameters of Eq. (19) is to use the least squares estimation procedure,
choosing those values which minimize the square of the residual vector eT e.
Econometricians define the coefficient of determination
R2 = 1− e
T e∑n
i=1(yi − y)2
, (22)
where yi = ln(p(ti)) and
y =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi (23)
is the sample mean of ln(p(ti)). The coefficient of determination is often inter-
preted as the ratio of the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained
by a model to the total amount of variation in that dependent variable. The
2All data on the S&P 500 index were obtained from the Center for Research on Securities
Prices (CRSP).
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closerR2 is to unity, the more variation in the dependent variable is explained by
the model. Note however that R2 is not invariant to linear transformations of
the yi, so one should not put too much emphasis on its value. Notwithstanding,
one could equally well characterize the least squares procedure as maximizing
the coefficient of determination.
Eq. (19) is linear in the parameters A, B, and C and nonlinear in the
remaining parameters. We use the downhill simplex method (see Chapter 10.4
of [16]) to minimize eT e as a function of β, ω, φ, tc, ∆t, and ∆ω . For each
choice of these nonlinear parameters, we obtain the best values of the linear
parameters A, B, and C using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods.
The square of the residual vector eT e is not a well-behaved concave
(down) function, so the local minimum obtained by the downhill simplex method
will depend on the initial starting point fed to the routine. Indeed, as was noted
in [2], one typically finds many local minima with fairly similar values of eT e.
Nonlinear least squares (NLLS) estimation requires that as the sample size goes
to infinity, n−1eT e should converge to a function with a unique global minimum
in some chosen parameter space (see [17]). However, NLLS theory does not
require that eT e have a unique global minimum within the parameter space for
finite samples, and the theory does not offer much guidance about how to deal
with a multiplicity of local minima having similar eT e values that deviate within
sampling error. The minimum with the lowest observed eT e value need not be
the closest minimum to the truth.
The first and second columns of Table 1 describe two such local minima
for the years prior to the 87 crash. The corresponding fits are plotted in Figs. 2
and 3. Notice that in the fit of Fig. 2, β = .74 in accord with the microscopic
model of [9]. However, the fit of Fig. 3 has β = 1.06, and the square of the
residual vector is a bit smaller in this second fit.
In addition to the multiplicity issue, we face another difficulty because
there is really no question that the pt are serially correlated, which complicates
the estimation of standard errors even for the linear parameters A, B, and C.
As a result, we do not report standard errors in Table 1, and we will postpone a
discussion of whether the individual terms in Eq. (19) are statistically significant
until the next section, where we consider the first differences of the price index.
For now, we will simply observe that it is possible to obtain a “reason-
able” fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 between 1980 and 1987. Between 1962
and 1998, the next three most significant drawdowns occurred in October 1974,
October 1997, and August 1998. As we demonstrate in Figs. 4-6, “reasonable”
fits (as reasonable as the fits in [10] for example) to Eq. (19) can also be ob-
tained during the year prior to each of these drops. This evidence might lead
one to conclude that there must be a correlation between spells of log-periodic
fluctuation and financial crashes.
However, this would be fallacious reasoning because we have not demon-
strated that such spells do not occur (with significant frequency) during periods
that do not culminate in a financial crash. In fact, when we randomly selected
a drawdown from the list of drawdowns between 1962 and 1998 with total mag-
nitude on the order of 1%, we picked a drop of 0.84% that occurred at the
10
t∗ 10/19/87 10/19/87 10/3/74 12/2/85 10/27/97 8/31/98
n 1959 1959 342 365 397 352
t1 1/2/80 1/2/80 4/26/73 5/23/84 3/7/96 3/11/97
tn 9/30/87 9/30/87 8/30/74 10/31/85 9/30/97 7/31/98
tc 11/14/87 9/30/87 9/22/74 11/14/85 1/3/98 3/2/99
A 5.89 5.77 2.84 5.24 7.07 7.29
B -.0046 -.00041 1.13 −2× 10−10 -.0066 -.0024
C .00051 -.000056 .0199 4× 10−11 -.00042 .00022
β 0.74 1.06 0.10 3.53 .73 .84
ω 9.64 -2.24 -1.20 14.64 4.95 10.41
φ -4.34 -0.38 -0.02 -6.47 1.60 -10.58
∆t 8.39 yr 4.84 yr 489.63 yr 0.98 yr 3.18 yr 12.74 yr
∆ω 11.65 28.85 55.90 -0.30 31.63 72.44
eT e 4.02 3.36 .24 .12 .18 0.15
R2 .978 .981 .932 .944 .973 .969
Table 1: Parameter values of fits to ln(p) for the logarithmic specification
Figure 2: Fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 from 1980 to 1987 with β = .74.
Parameters are given in the first column of Table 1.
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Figure 3: Fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 from 1980 to 1987 with β = 1.06.
Parameters are given in the second column of Table 1.
Figure 4: Fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 from April 1973 to October 1974.
Parameters are given in the third column of Table 1.
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Figure 5: Fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 from March 1996 to October 1997.
Parameters are given in the fifth column of Table 1.
Figure 6: Fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 from March 1997 to August 1998.
Parameters are given in the last column of Table 1.
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Figure 7: Fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 from May 1984 to December 1985.
Parameters are given in the fourth column of Table 1.
beginning of December 1985. We display the S&P 500 during the year prior to
this small drop in Fig. 7, and we see that this also can be fit to Eq. (19).
This suggests the possibility that there is nothing particularly special
about a finding of log-periodic fluctuations in the stock market. Laloux et
al. [18] also relate an experience where they observed log-periodic fluctuations
in a financial index, predicted a crash, and then were disappointed when none
occurred. The hypothesis of a correlation may still be rescued, however, if it
can be shown that fits with parameter values in a select set are harbingers of
crashes.
This was the approach taken by Feigenbaum and Freund [2], although
their definition of a log-periodic spell was ad hoc and not motivated by any
statistical theory. Between 1980 and 1994, they found three independent pe-
riods that satisfied their definition. A Monte Carlo simulation extending over
10,000 days, which modeled the stock market as a random walk, produced 17
such spells. The average time between a log-periodic spell and the next crash
was substantially less in the empirical data than it was in the simulation, which
suggests that there might indeed be an association between log-periodic crashes
and financial crashes. It should be noted that they worked with the specifica-
tion of Eq. (1), which has fewer parameters than the specification of Eq. (19).
It is possible that adding these extra parameters makes “good” fits to Eq. (19)
less extraordinary.
Johansen et al. ([9], [10]) describe a similar experiment where they
modeled the stock market as a GARCH process and searched for fits which
extended for about eight years and had α, ω, and ∆t parameters that fell within
a specific interval. They also did not find any linkage between a log-periodic
spell and an ensuing crash. Another test on the statistical significance of log-
periodicity was done by Huang et al. [19] in the context of earthquakes. They
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studied the Lomb periodograms of Monte Carlo simulations generated by a DGP
with normal i.i.d. noise in order to assess the statistical significance of observed
periodograms.
Unfortunately, all of these results are weakened by the fact that only
one possible data generating process was ruled out by each experiment. Fur-
thermore, the DGPs used in the two finance experiments were chosen for their
simplicity, not because they are credible models of the actual DGP for a stock
price . Feigenbaum and Freund used a random walk, but there is really no
question any more in the finance community that stock prices do not follow
random walks. As for GARCH processes, while these are considered a much
better model of the stock market during ordinary periods, there is no reason to
believe they are an appropriate model of the stochastic process during an ex-
treme event like a financial crash. In fact, the frequency of crashes in Johansen
et al.’s Monte Carlo simulations was much smaller than the frequency of crashes
in real data, so their DGP obviously does not adequately capture the behavior
of stock prices during and leading up to a crash.
Both Feigenbaum and Freund, and Sornette et al. also looked at ran-
domly selected time windows in the real data and generally found no evidence
of log-periodicity in these windows unless they were looking at a time period
in which a crash was imminent. While these results are not tied to any DGP
since there is no Monte Carlo simulation involved, it is still not clear what if
any conclusions can be drawn from this result. It is impossible to collect a ran-
dom sample of any size with independent draws from a single century of data.
Perhaps in the year 3000, our descendants will be better able to judge by this
method if log-periodicity really is an indicator of financial crashes. For those
of us who do not expect to live that long, some more clever approach must be
invented if we are to answer this question with any degree of confidence.
4 Behavior of First Differences
If we focus on a specific choice of the nonlinear parameters β, ω, φ, tc, ∆t,
and ∆ω in the specification of Eq. (19), then we have a specification linear in
the parameters A, B, and C, and we could naively perform statistical tests on
hypotheses regarding the values of these parameters. For example, it would
be of great interest to determine if C, the coefficient of the term responsible
for producing log-periodic oscillations in Eq. (19) is significantly different from
zero.
Unfortunately, a minor obstacle gets in the way of our doing this in a
consistent manner. Our hypothesis is that if j(t) = 0, then
y(t) = ln(p(t)) = A+Bf1(t) + Cf2(t) + ε(t), (24)
where ε(t) is a random disturbance term satisfying
Et0 [ε(t)] = 0. (25)
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There are well-known ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation formulas both for
point estimates of A, B, and C, and their corresponding standard errors. These
formulas apply if the ε(t) are homoskedastic and disturbances at different times
are uncorrelated. However, if we consider the S&P 500 from January 1980
to September 1987, the lag-1 autocorrelation3 for ln(p(t)) is .9994, which is
not surprising since security prices were once believed to follow random walks.
Stock prices may move up or down on a given day, but they rarely move far
from the previous day’s closing.
We can eliminate most, if not all, of this serial correlation by looking
not at ln(p(t)) but at the first differences of ln(p(t)). Define
yi = ln(p(ti)) (26)
and
∆yi = ln(p(ti))− ln(p(ti−1)). (27)
Then the lag-1 autocorrelation for ∆yi is only .1511 for the same period exam-
ined above.
Let us also define
∆ti = ti − ti−1 (28)
∆f1i = f1(ti)− f1(ti−1) (29)
∆f2i = f2(ti)− f2(ti−1). (30)
Then Eq. (24) implies
Et0 [∆yi|j(ti) = 0] = B∆f1i + C∆f2i. (31)
We will consider the augmented specification
Et0 [∆yi|j(ti)] = A+B∆f1i + C∆f2i +D2δ2i +D3δ3i +D4δ4i. (32)
The additional variables δ2i, δ3i, and δ4i are binary indicator variables (or so-
called “dummy variables”) which take on values of 0 or 1. For a given s,
the variable δsi will equal 1 if ∆ti equals s and 0 otherwise. The inclusion
of the constant term allows for the possibility of a constant drift in the stock
price index. Since the magnitude of this drift may depend on the length of
time between measurements, we also include the dummy variables. (Four is
the largest ∆t that appears in the data.) By doing this, we can, for example,
correct for weekend effects. These are of concern because weekly cycles in ∆y
might arise naturally from the institutional details of the market, and, if we did
not include them in the regression, an oscillatory function like ∆f2 might easily
project onto them, biasing the estimate of its coefficient.
In Fig. 8, we plot ∆yi as a function of time. No obvious oscillatory
pattern is apparent in the graph, although this does not prove that no pattern
is there.
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Figure 8: First differences of the logarithm of the S&P 500 from January 1980
to September 1987.
1/2/80-9/30/87 1/2/80-6/5/86
A .000668 .000450
B -.006384 -.019967
C -.001149 .001542
D2 .001712 .001646
D3 -.002029 -.002149
D4 -.002826 -.003463
tc 10/7/87 6/19/86
β 0.590 0.497
ω 7.333 8.255
φ 0.338 0.004
∆t 13.4 yr 1285 yr
∆ω 28.80 -0.79
Table 2: Parameter values for fits of the first differences of the S&P 500 from
January 1980 to September 1987 using the log-periodic specification.
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n 1958
eT e .159777
R2 0.0172
coeff. std. err. T p
A .000665 .000273 2.434 .015
B -.006334 .004826 -1.312 .190
C -.001130 .000251 -4.504 .000
D2 .001704 .002153 0.791 .429
D3 -.002034 .000605 -3.359 .001
D4 -.002832 .001450 -1.953 .051
Table 3: Estimation of linear parameters to log-periodic specification with full
data set.
Using the same downward simplex method used in Section 3, we obtain
the parameter values listed in the first column of Table 2. In Table 3, we
report the results of the corresponding OLS regression, holding the nonlinear
parameters fixed (the linear parameters deviate slightly from Table 2 because
they are computed by a different program). In addition to OLS standard errors,
we report corresponding T statistics and nominal p values which correspond to
the probability that |T | will be greater than or equal to its observed value under
a null hypothesis that the given coefficient is zero. Note that these nominal
p values are computed under the assumption of homoskedasticity and no serial
correlation. It is fairly well accepted that the S&P 500 is a heteroskedastic
process. Furthermore, while the autocorrelation of ∆yt may be insignificant, it
is well known that |∆yt| typically shows significant autocorrelation, so the ∆yt
time series is very likely serially dependent. Therefore the reported p values
should not be given much credence.
The search for standard error estimators which consistently estimate the
standard deviation of regression coefficients, even for a model which exhibits het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation of an unknown nature, is presently an active
field of econometric research. We explored both the Newey-West (see Chapters
11-12 of [20]) and the Kiefer-Vogelsang [21] approaches. However, our results
were not consistent between these different methods, which suggests that our
sample size is too small for the asymptotic probability theory underlying these
methods to be a good approximation. Consequently, it proved necessary to use
Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the finite-sample probability distribution
of the T statistics.
In order to perform Monte Carlo simulations, the null hypothesis must
completely specify the data-generating process (DGP) to be simulated. The
null hypothesis in this context, which is just the blanket assumption that there
is no log-periodicity, is a compound hypothesis and does not fully specify a
DGP. However, our main concern is whether any apparent log-periodicty can be
3We refer to the correlation between ε(ti) and ε(ti−l) as the lag-l autocorrelation.
18
n 1624
eT e .128761
R2 0.0143
coeff. std. err. T p
A .000451 .000309 1.458 .145
B -.020201 .009796 -2.062 .039
C .001555 .000481 3.232 .001
D2 .001647 .002327 0.708 .479
D3 -.002148 .000678 -3.169 .002
D4 -.003461 .001593 -2.172 .030
Table 4: Estimation of linear parameters to the best log-periodic specification
for the truncated data set.
accounted for by a simple specification of the index’s behavior such as a random
walk or a GARCH process. Matching the first and second moments of ∆y
conditional upon ∆t, we constructed a random walk with normally distributed
innovations.
In 20 simulations, six produced fits to the specification of (32) with T
statistics for B larger in magnitude than the observed value of -1.312, which
implies a p value of .30±.10. Thus the ∆f1 term is not statistically significant.
This is not entirely surprising since the inclusion of the f1 term in Eq. (24)
is really not well motivated in [12]. Unlike the f2 term, the f1 term does not
come out of Sornette and Johansen’s Landau expansion. Rather, it is included
ad hoc to account for the growth trend seen in most financial indices, though
this growth trend could also be accounted for by a constant drift. On the other
hand, we observe only one simulation with a T statistic for the log-periodic
coefficient C as large as 4.5 in magnitude. This implies a p-value of .050±.049,
so we do not firmly reject the log-periodic term at the 5% level.
If the Sornette-Johansen paradigm has any practical value though, we
should be able to predict a crash even if we do not have all the data leading
right up to the crash. What happens if we disregard the last year of stock
market data? Do the first differences of the S&P 500 contain the information
necessary to forecast a crash in October of 1987?
Using a window of data from January 1980 to June 1986, the best fit we
obtain is reported in the second column of Table 2, and the corresponding OLS
regression is given in Table 4. Notice that we do not forecast a crash in 1987.
Rather, we forecast a crash just beyond the end of the window. Using the same
DGP as before, in five of 20 simulations we obtained a T statistic larger than
3.23 for the log-periodic term, implying p = .250± .097. Thus the log-periodic
term is not significant at the 5% level in this fit.
As we noted in Section 3, the same data set may give several fits with
roughly similar values of eT e. Although the nonlinear parameters of the fit for
the full data set do not give the best fit for the truncated data set, conceivably
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n 1624
eT e .129005
R2 0.0124
coeff. std. err. T p
A .000065 .000438 0.147 .883
B -.032800 .016639 -1.971 .049
C -.000879 .000318 -2.767 .006
D2 .000723 .002362 0.306 .759
D3 -.002992 .000924 -3.239 .001
D4 -.004185 .001829 -2.288 .022
Table 5: Estimation of linear parameters for a log-periodic specification to the
truncated data set using the best nonlinear parameters obtained for the full
data set.
they could still produce a decent fit with a statistically significant log-periodic
component. An OLS regression using the nonlinear parameters of the first
column of Table 2 is reported in Table 5. In 20 simulations, 14 had T statistics
for C larger in magnitude than 2.767, so p = .700± .102. Thus even using the
nonlinear parameters that were statistically significant for the full data set, we
do not find a statistically significant log-periodic component in the truncated
data set.
Since the log-periodic function is significant for the full data set, there
must be some structure in the data which projects onto this function. However,
the failure of this function to produce a significant coefficient in the truncated
data set suggests the pertinent structure is localized within the last year before
the crash. Note that this structure need not be log-periodic. We can only
conclude that the log-periodic function represents this structure better than
any of the other functions included in the regression.
Whatever is happening in the last year, we can conclude that E[∆y]
does not have a statistically significant log-periodic trend through most of the
data set. More precisely, the ∆f2 term in the specification of Eqs. (31) and
(32) is not significant. Therefore, the f2 term in Eq. (24) is not significant,
which would imply that E[ln pt] has no log-periodic trend.
One might wonder how this can be reconciled with the fits observed in
Section 3. How can ln(p) behave log-periodically when its expectation does
not? Serial correlation may answer this question. A short string of several
increments which coincidentally fall in the same direction followed by a string
of increments in the opposite direction may create an oscillation completely by
happenstance with no underlying force behind it.
5 The Frequency Distribution of Drawdowns
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Figure 9: Frequency of draw downs for the S&P 500 index from 1962 to 1998.
The bin size is 1%.
In their search for an independent form of evidence to corroborate their
hypothesis that sizable financial crashes are often the culmination of forces that
build up over long periods of time, Johansen and Sornette [11] examined the
frequency distribution of drawdowns, a drawdown being the cumulative drop
in a financial index from a local maximum to the succeeding local minimum.
Fig. 9 displays a semilog graph of the frequency distribution of drawdowns
larger than 0.5% for the S&P 500 during the period 1962-1998. If we disregard
the lone drawdown of magnitude larger than 20%, which corresponds to the
October 1987 crash, it is immediately apparent that this semilog graph looks
linear. Seizing upon this observation, Sornette and Johansen concluded that
there must be two populations of drawdowns. The majority of drawdowns have
an exponential distribution, and these constitute the first population. Those
drawdowns, like the 87 crash, which do not obey this exponential distribution
constitute the second population. Sornette and Johansen further suggest that
the first population is produced by the normal behavior of a financial index
obeying a GARCH process. In contrast, the second population is the result
of the imitative behavior of investors, and it is this population that exhibits
log-periodic oscillations prior to the drawdown.
While the frequency distribution of the first population of drawdowns
(every data point except the 87 outlier) may look exponential, we can objectively
test whether it actually is exponential. In Table 6, we present the results of
a regression of the logarithm of the frequency versus a quadratic function of
the drawdown size d. The alleged outlier, the October 87 crash, was not
included as a data point in this regression. Nevertheless, the quadratic term
in this regression with the 87 crash excluded is statistically significant at the
1% level. The justification for treating the 87 crash separately was that it did
not fit to a line through the other drawdowns. However, the significance of
the quadratic term indicates the logarithm of the frequency distribution for the
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# of obs. 12
eT e .180
R2 .969
coefficient standard error T p
d -1.097 0.155 -7.065 0.000
d2 0.039 0.012 3.378 0.008
constant 7.812 0.439 17.801 0.000
Table 6: Regression of the logarithm of the frequency of draw downs versus
a quadratic function of the draw down size d. The October 1987 crash is not
included.
# of obs. 12
eT e .196
R2 .9666
coefficient standard error T p
d.8 -1.549 0.230 -6.722 0.000
d2 0.022 0.010 2.280 0.049
constant 8.348 0.534 15.640 0.000
Table 7: Regression of the logarithm of the frequency of draw downs versus
d.8 and d2, where d is the draw down size d. The October 1987 crash is not
included.
remaining drawdowns is not linear either. Since a nonexponential frequency
distribution can certainly be found that fits to all the data, the visual evidence
of two populations is unconvincing.
Aware of these deviations from the exponential curve, Johansen and
Sornette have recently proposed ([22]) that the first population is better de-
scribed by a “stretched” exponential
N(d) = exp(A+Bdx), (33)
where N(d) is the frequency of drawdowns of size d. They find that x ≈ .8− .9.
Using this specification on our data set, we find the best value of x within the
interval [.8, 1] to be .8 and obtain the regression estimates of Table 7. Notice
that the d2 term remains statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus the
specification of the stretched exponential with x ∈ [.8, 1] must also be rejected.
However, if we allow x to range beyond this interval, we find that x = .5
gives the best fit, and if we include a term linear or quadratic in d neither is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, if we consider a specification
of the form
N(d) = exp(A+B
√
d+ Cd), (34)
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# of obs. 13
eT e .289
R2 .9519
coefficient standard error T p
d.5 -5.148 0.570 -9.023 0.000
d 0.542 0.089 6.069 0.000
constant 11.847 0.842 14.071 0.000
Table 8: Regression of the logarithm of the frequency of draw downs versus d.5
and d, where d is the draw down size d. The October 1987 crash is included.
then we are able to accomodate all the data including the 87 outlier. In Table
8, we give the regression estimates for such a specification and we obtain a
favorable R2 = .9519, so with this data set it does not seem reasonable at all to
treat the 87 crash differently from other drawdowns. Nevertheless, it is possible
that this result is an artifact of the small data set available to us.
Johansen and Sornette considered the specification (33) over the distri-
bution of drawdowns for a much larger time period. They also looked at many
other financial time series besides the S&P 500, and they consistently obtained
values of x ∼ 1. In more than half of these examples, though, it is patently
obvious that the specification (33) is wrong, for statistically significant devia-
tions are clearly visible in their graphs. If the model is misspecified, no valid
inferences can be drawn from it.
Of course, in Section 3, we saw that the 87 crash was not the only
drawdown between 1962 and 1998 with a log-periodic precursor. If we had
an objective way of distinguishing drawdowns with log-periodic precursors from
drawdowns without such precursors, then it is still possible that the distribution
of drawdowns without precursors is exponential.
6 Concluding Remarks
While the evidence of log-periodic precursors to financial crashes has spawn-
ed a minor industry in the physics community, it is apparent that a more rig-
orous investigation of this phenomenon must be conducted before we can come
to a firm conclusion that log-periodic oscillations reflect a discrete scale invari-
ance underlying the economy and furthermore that such oscillations signal an
impending crash. In particular, it would be desirable for researchers to agree
upon an objective definition of what constitutes a log-periodic spell so that a
statistical association between these spells and ensuing crashes can be firmly
established.
We must emphasize that a physicist who endeavors to successfully carry
out these goals will have to employ and perhaps even invent advanced statistical
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Figure 10: The standard deviation of daily changes to the logarithm of the
S&P 500 sampled over a moving window of fifty trading days from January
1980 to October 1987.
methods of a nature that may be unfamiliar to him because they are simply
unnecessary in more customary physics settings. A physicist can typically rely
more confidently on elementary statistical methods because he can do controlled
experiments. He can often identify and directly measure the relevant sources of
error. Testing a model can be just a matter of determining whether the model
agrees with the data to within a degree that can be accounted for by these known
sources of error. In contrast, an econometrician’s task is vastly more difficult,
at least as far as testing models goes, for he must simultaneously estimate
the parameters of his model and the properties of any unmodeled disturbances
using the same data set (which was probably gathered under less than ideal
conditions). As a result, econometricians have had to acquire complicated
tools to efficiently salvage as much information as they can from their data, and
physicists who expand into this realm will have to do the same.
While the present work does not refute what has come before, we think
it does shed some doubt on the hypothesis of discrete scale invariance in financial
markets. Though log-periodicity is visually apparent in the S&P 500 preceeding
the 87 crash, we find no evidence of log-periodicity in the mean function of this
index prior to a year before the crash. This would suggest that if log-periodicity
is embedded in the stochastic process of the index, then it must be conveyed
in higher-order moments. However, evidence of log-periodicity in the second
moment of the process is also lacking. In Fig. 10, we plot a measure of the
volatility of the S&P 500, the standard deviation of ∆y sampled over a moving
window of fifty trading days, from January 1980 to October 1987. No pattern
of log-periodicity can be seen in the graph.
The negative result of this paper is also troubling from a theoretical per-
spective. While Johansen et al. ([9]) are not alone in their efforts to construct
an economic model which can produce log-periodic price series (see for example
[23]), economists would be reluctant to embrace any theory that diverges from
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Johansen et al.’s attempt to ensure the model is robust to the introduction of a
rational agent with rational expectations. There are today economic theorists
exploring models in which agents are not fully rational, but a model whose pre-
dictions absolutely depend on there being no one in the economy who has a good
grasp of how the world works is not likely to acquire a large following. Any
model which does not suffer from this disease will have to satisfy a restriction
like the martingale condition of Eq. (15).
A model which incorporates discrete scale invariance and log-periodicity
in its structure would not necessarily imply that the expectation of prices must
also behave log-periodically. However, if log-periodicity arises because the
probability of a crash behaves log-periodically, then it is difficult to imagine
how one could avoid making the prediction that the expected price must also
behave log-periodically. If nothing else, the results of this paper would seem to
demonstrate that a more circuitous explanation of log-periodicity is required.
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